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Hypercomputation, Frege, Deleuze: Solving Thomson’s Lamp 
ABSTRACT 
We present the first known solution to the original supertask, the Thomson Lamp 
Paradox. Supertasks, or infinite operations, form an integral part of the emerging study of 
hypercomputation (computation in excess of classical Turing machine capabilities) and 
are of philosophical interest for the paradoxes they engender. 
 
We also offer preliminary resources for classifying computational complexity of various 
supertasks. In so doing we consider a newly apparent paradox between the metrical limit 
and the ordinal limit. We use this distinction between the metrical and ordinal limits to 
explain the shortcomings both of Thomson’s original formulation of the Lamp Paradox 
and Benacerraf’s consequent critique.  
 
We resolve this paradox through a careful consideration of transfinite ordinals and locate 
its ambiguity as inherent to the identity relation under logic with a close reading of 
Frege’s Begriffsschrift. With this close reading in hand we expose how the identity 
relation is counter-intuitively polyvalent and, with supertasks, how the logico-
mathematical field operates on the basis of Deleuzian point-folds. Our results combine 
resources from philosophy, mathematics, and computer science to ground the field of 
hypercomputation for logically rigorous study. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In “Tasks and Super-Tasks” Thomson proposes a number of supertasks (infinite 
operations) and each time asks the same question: Can we determine what the state of the 
world is after the supertask’s completion? The paradoxes therein convinced Thomson 
and other philosophers that any supertask was self-contradictory.  
 
It was not until Benacerraf demonstrated a logical error in Thomson’s paradox proof 
roughly ten years later that the topic of supertasks opened once more. However, 
Benacerraf stops short of answering Thomson’s thematic question: Do we have a way of 
explaining what it means for a supertask to be finished? 
 
We present an original solution to Thomson’s most celebrated paradox, the Thomson 
Lamp, by answering this question in the affirmative. We begin by discussing two other 
supertask paradoxes Thomson supplies as way of mathematical and philosophical 
preparation. We discuss resources for categorizing the complexity of supertasks and 
consider an additional paradox between metrical and ordinal limits uncovered in our 
solution to Thomson’s Lamp. We conclude with a close reading of the identity relation in 
Frege’s Begriffsschrift and a provocative suggestion of the supertask as a Deleuzian 
point-fold. 
 
SUPERTASKS AND PARADOX 
We owe Thomson a great deal for succinctly formulating the main question of supertasks. 
“Is it conceivable that someone should have completed an infinite number of tasks? Do 
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we know what this would be like?” (2).1 Thomson takes as his inspiration the paradoxes 
given by Zeno of Elea and offers several of his own to circumscribe the question.  
 
We consider three main paradoxes Thomson offers: infinitely divisible chocolate, a man 
running from [0, 1), and the Thomson Lamp. From the outset Thomson is precise about 
what qualifies as a supertask. Immediately following the quotation above, Thomson 
writes “It is necessary here to avoid a common confusion…to say that some operation 
can be performed infinitely often is not to say that a super-operation can be performed” 
(2). 
 
Thomson distinguishes between the capacity to perform a single operation an infinite 
number of times and the capacity to perform a single, infinite operation. “Suppose (A) 
that every lump of chocolate can be cut in two, and (B) that the result of cutting a lump of 
chocolate in two is always that you get two lumps of chocolate. It follows that every 
lump of chocolate is infinitely divisible” (2).  
 
From this chocolate splitting he derives a means to differentiate between a set of 
infinitely many possibilities and the possibility of infinity itself (3). “But to say that a 
lump is infinitely divisible is just to say that it can be cut into any number of parts. Since 
there is an infinite number of numbers, we could say: there is an infinite number of 
numbers of parts into which the lump can be divided. And this is not to say that it can be 
divided into an infinite number of parts” (2). 
                                                
1 Throughout, simple parenthetical cites refer to Thomson’s “Tasks and Super-Tasks” 
essay. 
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It is crucial to grasp the difference. Though there are an infinite number of numbers of 
parts possible, Thomson does not accept that this means there is some number called 
‘infinity’ using which we can divide the chocolate into ‘infinity’ parts. “If something is 
infinitely divisible, and you are to say into how many parts it shall be divided, you have 
ℵ0 alternatives from which to choose. This is not to say that ℵ0 is one of them” (2). 
 
Let us define more precisely the difference between ℵ0 choices and the choice of ℵ0. 
Consider the relationship between ℕ and ω. ℕ is the set of all natural, or counting, 
numbers. For us this is the set {0, 1, 2…}. ω, the first transfinite ordinal, is the first 
number that comes after all the members of the set ℕ. We can say that ω is the first 
number after the infinity of numbers in ℕ. The ℵ0 that Thomson mentions is the 
cardinality, or size as number of elements, of the set ℕ. It is also the cardinality of the set 
ω, for as we shall see, in Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with choice (ZFC), the standard 
construction of numbers is as sets. 
 
Thus Thomson wants us to bear in mind that having a set whose cardinality is ℵ0 does not 
mean that ℵ0 itself is a member of that set. Here ℵ0 is used somewhat imprecisely, since 
what Thomson is really talking about is ω, a point he clarifies later on. We can rewrite 
Thomson’s claim as: having all the members of ℕ as choices does not mean we have the 
choice ω. 
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Returning to the chocolate, Thomson blames the imprecision of everyday language for 
eliding the slip between having ℵ0 many choices and having ℵ0 itself as a choice. “If I say 
‘It is possible to swim the Channel’ I cannot go on to deny that it is conceivable that 
someone should have swum the Channel. But this analogy is only apparent” (3). If one 
cannot have ℵ0 itself as a choice, then the completion of a supertask remains 
inconceivable.  
 
It is important to note the tense of his example. Thomson is concerned with whether 
“someone should have swum the Channel,” or, whether someone should have completed 
a supertask (3). What is being pointed at is the first moment upon completion of a 
supertask. Throughout, this point in time is the lynchpin for Thomson. 
 
To illustrate the difference between “an infinity of possibilities” and “the possibility of 
infinity” Thomson continues dividing his chocolate (3). However, the way in which he 
does so renders his results mathematically invalid for reasons that will become important 
in our discussion of infinite series. Recall that Thomson writes, “there is an infinite 
number of numbers of parts into which the lump can be divided” (2). Further, “each of an 
infinite number of things can be done, e.g. bisecting, trisecting, etc.” (3). Finally, “the 
operation of halving it or halving some part of it can be performed infinitely often” (2, 
emphasis mine). 
 
What does it mean for an infinite number of numbers of parts to be possible? Thomson 
began by claiming, “to say that a lump is infinitely divisible is just to say that it can be 
PRE-PUBLICATION DRAFT 
02/18/2015 
6 
cut into any number of parts” (2). Strictly speaking there is no need to require cutting into 
any number of parts to guarantee it is infinitely divisible. We could require chocolate to 
be divided into any number of lumps except three. In this manner we could start with one 
lump, halve it into two, halve those into four, etc. We would still have infinitely many 
numbers of parts (since the series can progress without upper bound), but we would have 
excluded a possible number: three. 
 
While the point might seem pedantic, precision in discussing ω, as well as the limit as 
one approaches ω, permits our approach to succeed where others have faltered. The 
reason the series is unbounded on the upper end has to do with ω. Because ω is a limit 
ordinal, ω – 1 = ω. As a first blush of the argument, it is simple to see that if ω - 1 ≠ ω, 
then there is some number one less than ω that nonetheless is also greater than all other 
members of ℕ. However, this contradicts the definition of ω as the first such number. 
 
Given the three quotations above, Thomson imagines a chocolate-cutter capable of 
dividing any lump of chocolate with any number of cuts at any step in the process. Our 
series of chocolate, expressed in total lumps of chocolate, could be: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6… by 
cutting only one of the previous two sub-lumps. Or it could progress 1, 2, 4…. Or a 
particularly obstinate chocolate-cutter might refuse to cut at all, yielding 1, 1, 1…. Or, we 
might choose to cut at some unspecified time X, suddenly transforming from 1 into 2 in a 
manner analogous to grue: 1, 1, 1… ?, 2. 
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This malleability of when and how to cut weakens the thought experiment 
mathematically, for such a series is no longer a mathematical series. A series is a 
sequence, which is a function on a countable (has cardinality ℵ0) and totally ordered 
(every element is either greater, smaller, or equal to another) set. A function maps 
elements from its domain to its co-domain. Crucially, every element in its domain must 
map to one and only one element in the co-domain.  
 
In our example above one lump of chocolate might map to two, one, or some unspecified 
probability of either one or two. Two might map to three or four, etc. Hence, this example 
is not a function and therefore cannot be a series.  
 
THOMSON’S LAMP INTRODUCED 
The canonical example on the logical impossibility of supertasks is Thomson’s 
eponymous lamp. He describes to the reader “certain reading-lamps” that have a button in 
the base (5). Pressing the button switches the state of the lamp. If it was off, it is now on, 
and vice versa.  
 
Applying the infinite geometric series xn = 1/2n-1 (which sums to two) where n is the term 
of the sequence, Thomson asks what the final result is if we make one jab for each time 
interval (1, ½, ¼…). “Suppose now the lamp is off, and I succeed in pressing the button 
an infinite number of times, perhaps making one jab in one minute, another jab in the 
next half-minute, and so on…After I have completed the whole infinite sequence of jabs, 
i.e. at the end of the two minutes, is the lamp on or off?” (5). 
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Thomson declares the question impossible to solve, since, “I did not ever turn it on 
without at once turning it off…[and] I never turned it off without at once turning it on. 
But the lamp must be either on or off. This is a contradiction” (5). Hence the terminal 
state of the lamp remains a mystery. 
 
Benacerraf successfully challenges this conclusion with the following critique. 
Demarcating the beginning and final instants of time for the lamp task as t0 and t1 
Benacerraf explains, “From this it follows only that there is no time between t0 and t1 at 
which the lamp was on and which was not followed by a time also before t1 at which it 
was off. Nothing whatever has been said about the lamp at t1 or later” (Benacerraf, 768).  
 
He concludes that Thomson has been asking for the impossible by applying conditions 
about the state of the lamp that are prior to t1 to the lamp at t1. Thus there is no final, ωth 
act to determine the state of the lamp. For Benacerraf this does not mean the lamp 
terminates in a contradictory in-between state, but rather that the contradiction Thomson 
uncovers is a false contradiction.  
 
Thomson acknowledges the lack of a final, ωth act in his rebuttal to Benacerraf, writing, 
“If the successive transitions of S [the system] are caused by successive acts of an agent, 
then for the purposes of this Gedankenexperiment we want the agent not to perform an 
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ωth act; it would only get in the way. But then there is still a last uncaused transition, and 
it is this that we want to inquire about” (ZP, 134) .2 
 
From this discussion we take that Benacerraf is right to vitiate Thomson’s proof of the 
paradoxical nature of supertasks on the grounds that the condition of the lamp 
immediately reversing state only applies to moments in time before t1. However, 
Thomson is also correct in his rebuttal to note that the central question remains 
unanswered: What state is the lamp in at the conclusion of this supertask? If no such 
description of the lamp’s final state can be given, we might follow Thomson and 
conclude it inadvisable to speak of supertasks after all. 
 
RUNNING [0, 1) 
To give a description of the lamp’s state at the end of the supertask we must define 
precisely what moment in time corresponds to the end of the supertask. Considering 
another example helps clarify the situation. 
 
Imagine a runner who must pass through all the mid-points between the interval Z that is 
[0, 1). He must touch ½, ¾, etc. Since the interval is closed on the left and open on the 
right, 1 is not part of Z, but 0, his starting point, is (10). “Further: suppose someone could 
have occupied every Z-point without having occupied any point external to Z. Where 
would he be? Not at any Z-point, for then there would be an unoccupied Z-point to the 
                                                
2 Throughout, ZP refers to Thomson’s essay rebutting Benacerraf in Zeno’s Paradoxes. 
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right. Not, for the same reason, between Z-points. And, ex hypothesi, not at any point 
external to Z. But these possibilities are exhaustive” (10). 
 
Benacerraf’s response to this paradox is exactly the same as his response to the lamp. 
Since some time after the completion of the supertask must come (else, the supertask’s 
time to complete is unbounded and therefore it does not complete), conditions about the 
position of the runner given by the supertask can apply only to positions before time t1. 
 
In his response Thomson later acknowledges he thought of the [0, 1) example “as a kind 
of joke,” since “[t]he resulting situation is simply that [the runner] occupies 1” (ZP, 130). 
Nonetheless he acknowledges the force of Benacerraf’s counter-argument, both with 
respect to his construction of the lamp and his attempt to analogize the [0, 1) paradox to 
the lamp (ZP, 130-31). He maintains that there exists “some conceptual difficulty about 
the idea of a lamp having been turned on and off infinitely often, because, roughly 
speaking, of the question about the state of the lamp immediately afterwards,” and that 
this concern is independent of the particular way in which he sought to find a 
contradiction (ZP, 130, 131-32). 
 
There is still something to be gained from Thomson’s thought experiment on the interval 
[0, 1), and that has to do with the status of ω and ω+1 as ordinals, or numbers that denote 
position (1st, 2nd, etc.). Thomson notes that the runner who successfully runs an infinite 
sequence of midpoints from 0 to 1 (and arrives at 1) “is not a sequence of type ω but a 
sequence of type ω+1 (last task, no penultimate task), the sequence of the points 0, ½, … 
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, 1 in Z’s closure” (12). A sequence of type ω has no last task, since there is no number 
immediately ‘before’ ω. ω+1 does have a last task, the one taking the sequence from ω to 
ω+1. 
 
Our sympathies lie with Thomson here, for it is precisely the closure of the interval [0, 1) 
through the addition of the point 1 that is brought about by taking the series from ω to 
ω+1. This is the same reason why in his rebuttal Thomson points to the fact that the ωth 
transition remains exactly on the bound. Considering Thomson’s Lamp we find an 
intuitive application of this distinction. The infinite geometric series xn has only ω many 
in-order terms. Thus, ω+1, in a sense to be made more precise shortly, refers to the first 
term that is not actually a member of the geometric series. That is to say, the first moment 
in time after the completion of the supertask, after the position ω. 
 
To clarify what is meant by ω and ω+1 we need now to pause and consider numbers. 
 
NUMBERS, TRANSFINITE AND ORDINAL 
As previously stated, ω is the first transfinite ordinal, the first number larger than all 
members of ℕ. ω+1 is simply the next number. But how shall we define numbers, and 
how can we define ω? Following von Neumann’s standard construction of ordinals,3 we 
hold that the ordinal numbers are sets that include all the numbers below them starting 
from and inclusive of zero.  
                                                
3 Cf. von Neumann, John. “On the introduction of transfinite numbers.” (1923). From 
Frege to Gödel: a source book in mathematical logic, 1879-1931. ed. Heijenoort, Jean. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967. 
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For example, the number 5 is {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. Likewise, the number ω must include all the 
members of ℕ. Note that a number is not present in its set: 5 does not appear in 5. Note 
also that the cardinality of the set is equivalent to the name we give it (the cardinality of 
the set 5 is in fact 5), a point we return to in our solution to Thomson’s Lamp. 
 
Movement up the chain of natural numbers is given by the successor function S(a) = a ∪ 
{a}, with 0 defined as the empty set, ∅. Thus 1 is ∅ ∪{∅}, which yields {∅},the set 
containing the empty set. Alternatively we may write 1 as {0}. To get 2 we reapply the 
successor operation, yielding S(1) = 1 ∪ {1}, which gives {0, 1}, etc. However, ω 
presents a different case. 
 
ω is a special ordinal because it is a limit ordinal.  
 
A limit ordinal is an ordinal number that is not a successor ordinal.  Specifically, 
an ordinal W is a limit ordinal if and only if there exists some ordinal x < W, and 
for any x < W there exists another ordinal y such that x < y < W.4  
 
We will comment on this extraordinary definition shortly, but first we must ask, how can 
we generate a limit ordinal? A limit ordinal cannot be given by the successor operation 
                                                
4 An alternative but equivalent definition is offered on p. 20 of Jech, Thomas J., Set 
Theory. Third Millennium Edition. Springer, 2003. We offer the above formation for 
clarity of argument. 
PRE-PUBLICATION DRAFT 
02/18/2015 
13 
since every ordinal given in such a manner can produce another ordinal greater than it by 
one more application of the successor operation.  
 
The operation required to produce a limit ordinal is the supremum.5 A limit ordinal is the 
supremum of all the ordinals below it, which is given by taking their union. In the case of 
a normal, finite number we can see that the supremum exists conventionally speaking, as 
the maximum.  
 
For the limit ordinal ω there is no ordinal immediately prior to it, by definition. It is 
against this infinite succession of ordinals that one must take the union, and in so doing 
produce a supremum where no maximum exists, thereby generating ω. Once generated, ω 
is free to appear as an element in the set of a larger ordinal via the successor operation, 
thereby paving the way for ω+1, ω+2, etc. 
 
This generation of a supremum without a maximum may seem scandalous. 
Mathematically speaking, it stands on solid ground. Present in the ZFC axioms is not 
only an Axiom of Infinity (an infinite set exists), but also an Axiom of Union (defining 
the union operation). ω is what happens when infinite successor operations are possible 
and the union of that infinite sequence is taken. It is a supremum of a set with no 
maximum, made possible by an Axiom of Union that is every bit as powerful as the 
Axiom of Infinity. 
                                                
5 The meaning of the word supremum varies with context. In some contexts ℕ has no 
supremum, e.g. when it is embedded in ℝ. In ordinal theory every set of ordinals has a 
supremum. 
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Returning to our runner, what are we to understand when Thomson writes that the runner 
at position 1 “is not a sequence of type ω but a sequence of type ω+1 (last task, no 
penultimate task), the sequence of the points 0, ½, … , 1 in Z’s closure” (12)?  
 
Were the task to remain an order-type of ω, it would still involve members of ℕ, which 
means that ω itself would never be reached. This much follows readily from our 
construction of ordinals as containing the whole numbers below them, starting from and 
inclusive of zero. But what does it mean to generate ω, that is, to reach ω only through a 
task of order-type ω+1? 
 
It means that the supremum alone is insufficient, but instead a supremum plus an 
additional successor operation, S(ω), is required. Seen in this light it becomes clear that 
for all supertasks, questions of their completeness must necessarily be about order-types 
ω+1.  
 
With the distinction between ω and ω+1 clear, we can now tackle the question of how to 
evaluate a supertask’s completion more precisely. We know the evaluation must take 
place at point ω+1, but is it an evaluation of the function representing the supertask, or an 
evaluation of the state of the world? If it is the former, the function is undefined at ω+1 
(the supertask is finished), which is exactly why Benacerraf’s critique is trenchant. If it is 
the world, then we must ask what is meant precisely by ω+1 in the context of the world. 
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Is it not instead world + 2 minutes6 (assuming the ω tasks are accomplished, along with 
the final transition of the system at moment ω, within two minutes)? The following quote 
from Thomson’s rebuttal to Benacerraf is worth reproducing in full. 
 
“In general, the idea of an ω-task arises from consideration of a bounded ω-
sequence of points on the real line. If the sequence is not bounded there is not 
even the semblance of a likelihood that the task can be completed; if it is 
bounded, the sequence will have a least upper bound and there will be some 
question to ask about the state of the world or about what happens at some time 
corresponding to that bound” (Thomson, ZP, 134). 
 
It is worth recalling that the number of terms in the time-sequence remained of order-type 
ω, with cardinality ℵ0. Consequently, to speak of an order type ω+1 requires us to speak 
of the smallest possible first instant of time within which the supertask is complete, 
which is when our analysis shifts focus from the function representing the supertask to 
the state of the world.  
 
THOMSON’S LAMP SOLVED 
With this preparation in place we ask the following question. Can we establish that there 
exists a supertask that is logically possible? If yes, then we have solved Thomson’s initial 
                                                
6 Technically, as we will see, it is world + 2 minutes + ψ  where ψ is the limit as n tends 
to infinity of xn = 1/n. In other words, it is the first instant in time following the 
completion of the supertask, and is in some sense external to the completion of the 
supertask itself (which is why the sequence defining the supertask is undefined at this 
point). Here we see it expressed in ψ, using the language of infinitesimal limits. 
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claim that supertasks are inherently paradoxical. To do so we must answer the nexus 
question: What state is the lamp in after two minutes of infinite button presses have 
elapsed? We maintain the following original solution constitutes the first known solution 
to Thomson’s Lamp. 
 
The lamp maintains its original state. As Thomson notes, an even number of switches 
will maintain the lamp's state while an odd number will change it (5). Thus the only 
question that requires answering is, “Is infinity even?” It is, when we use the set-theoretic 
definition of even to mean capable of subdivision into two disjoint subsets of equal 
cardinality. As we will show, this set-theoretic definition of even is equivalent to the 
numerical, “divisible by 2” definition to which we are accustomed. 
 
It is trivial to show that a countably infinite set can be divided into two disjoint subsets of 
equal cardinality. Consider ℕ. From the definitions for even and odd we know that if a 
given integer j is even, j+1 is odd. From the definition of ℕ we know that for all j ∈ ℕ, 
j+1 exists. Accordingly we can subdivide ℕ into two disjoint subsets of evens and odds 
respectively, both of which have the same cardinality.7 
 
One might object to our usage of the set-theoretic definition of even since Thomson was 
asking a question about the number of tasks performed, and of what number (1 or 0, on or 
off) would represent the lamp’s final state. However, the two definitions are equivalent, 
                                                
7 They happen to also have the same cardinality as the original set ℕ, since all three sets 
are countably infinite. This quality is at the root of Galileo’s perfect squares paradox. 
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once the consequences of a set-theoretic construction of numbers is understood more 
fully.  
 
We traditionally define even and odd as follows. 
 
 Eqn 1.1  An even integer n = 2k where k is some other integer 
 Eqn 1.2  An odd integer m = 2k + 1 where k is some other integer 
 
We can rewrite these definitions in terms of our earlier set-theoretic definition of number. 
Let us define a natural number r as a set s that contains all natural numbers that precede r, 
starting from and inclusive of 0. So again we have the integer 5 defined as the set {0, 1, 2, 
3, 4}. Note that the cardinality of s is equivalent to r. Let us use the set-theoretic 
definition of odd and even to define the oddness or evenness of set s. If set s can be 
divided into two disjoint sets (whose union contains all its elements) that are 
equinumerous (whose cardinalities are equivalent), then we say set s is even. If not, set s 
is odd. 
 
Let us denote the sets u and v as the two disjoint subsets into which we divide s. Let us 
denote the cardinalities of u and v as w and x respectively. If and only if w = x, can we 
say that the set s has successfully been divided into two disjoint subsets of 
equinumerality. However, if w = x, then we can express r, the cardinality of set s, as 2 * 
w. If not, we express r as 2 * w + 1, since at most the count can be off by one (since we 
have been choosing from among two subsets, and thus if we had two extra items left in 
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our parent set, then each subset would have received one, etc.). Thus we have arrived at 
our so-called ‘numerical’ definition of even from the set-theoretic. 
 
We can see that the two disjoint subsets into which we divide the button presses of the 
Thomson Lamp can be none other than the sets of ‘switch to on’ and ‘switch to off,’ just 
as they appeared in Thomson’s use of the Grandi sequence (6). 8 What is novel is the 
knowledge that the termination of the supertask depends, in this case, on the initial 
configuration. If the lamp was on, it remains on at the conclusion. Else, it remains off. 
 
One might object that even though the cardinalities of the two subsets are equivalent, 
both are ℵ0, which is the same cardinality as our original set ω. Hence, it might be 
impossible to determine which of our ℵ0 subsets terminates ‘after’ the other, voiding our 
application of evenness to the proof.  
 
Such worries are easily put to rest once we view the ℵ0 cardinality of the parity proof’s 
two disjoint subsets as a restatement of 2ω = ω. That 2ω = ω is clearly understood once 
order-types are applied rigorously. Since ω is an ordinal we know it is specifying a 
positioning, or sequencing of elements. To say that 2ω = ω is simply to say that ω pairs in 
sequence possess the same order-type as ω singletons in sequence. 
                                                
8 The sequence is 1 – 1 + 1 – 1…. Thomson assigns the states ‘0’ and ‘1’ to ‘lamp off’ 
and ‘lamp on,’ and asks what the sum of Grandi’s sequence can tell us about the lamp’s 
final state. In our opinion the question is misguided, as the sum of this divergent series is 
given as ½, which is not a reason for supertasks being internally self-contradictory, as 
Thomson supposes, but instead is due to the particular definition of a Cesàro sum, 
whereby a second converging series is constructed by the partial means in order to find a 
consistent value to assign as the sum for certain divergent sequences. 
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At first this explanation does not seem to extricate us from our quandary, since the pairs 
are obviously (switch, switch) pairs of button presses (Thomson’s claim of never once 
turning the lamp on without turning it off and vice versa). However, we can use our 
initial knowledge about the lamp’s state at the beginning of the experiment to fix the state 
of the lamp upon completion. Since the ω pairs of (switch, switch) will take place 
regardless of what state the lamp is in at the beginning, and since we know that an even 
number of state transformations preserves state, we can see that the initial state of the 
lamp can be removed without affecting the even number of state transformations that take 
place. And in fact, it is removed, since the initial state does not count as a button press. 
Hence, the initial state remains the final state as previously described.9 
 
Finally, an inquisitive reader might inquire if 3ω = ω, thereby demonstrating an arbitrary 
decision to subdivide into two disjoint subsets instead of three.10 Perhaps this argument 
points to slippage between the set-theoretic and numerical definitions of parity, which 
earlier were claimed to be equivalent. No such slippage is evident. That a number (set) 
may also be divided into thirds (or fourths, or…) does not mean it cannot also be even. 
                                                
9 For another way of thinking through this proof, we might consider what was at stake 
when Cesàro sums became the accepted way of fixing the sum of certain infinite 
divergent series. The need for a way to fix the sum was precisely because alternative 
methods, all of which seemed reasonable, gave inconsistent results. If one took Grandi’s 
sum as 1 + (-1 + 1) + (-1 + 1)… then the answer was 1. If one grouped the terms as (1 - 1 
) + (1 - 1)… then the answer was 0. We can view the initial state of the lamp as an 
instruction on how to group the terms. 
10 For example, the three subsets {n ∈ ℕ | n mod 3 = 0},  {n ∈ ℕ | n mod 3 = 1},  {n ∈ ℕ | n mod 3 = 2}. In this manner arbitrarily many disjoint subsets of equal cardinality 
may be constructed from ℕ. Thanks to [REDACTED] for this formulation, and much 
kind counsel besides. 
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SUPERTASK COMPLEXITY  
We can now put to rest Thomson’s anxieties about having a “method for deciding what is 
done when a super-task is done” (6). However, the generalizability of our results is an 
open question. “One difficulty, then, about the question of whether ω-tasks can be 
completed is that there are different kinds of them, and there is no reason to think that in 
regard to completability they stand or fall together” (ZP, 136). Nonetheless, it is a 
significant result to be able to declare that there exists a supertask for which a logical 
rendition of the state of the world following its completion may be given. That this 
supertask happens to be the ur-supertask is a happy coincidence.  
 
Regarding the generalizability of our results, we now prove the following theorem.  
 
 Theorem 1: Any ω0-task describable by a state transition system with a period of  
 length less than ω0 reachable by a path of length less than ω0 has a solution  
 completely determined by its starting state. 
 
ω0-task refers to supertask in the sense we have been using it in this paper. Thomson will 
often abbreviate this as “ω-task,” a convention from which we briefly depart for technical 
precision. Period refers to a cycle (e.g. ending where you began) in a state transition 
system. The length of a period refers to the number of transitions made to complete one 
cycle. 
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We now define a mathematical object, inspired by automata theory, which we call a 
“state transition system” (abbreviated STS). 11  An STS consists of: 
• Set of states 
• Set of starting states  
• Transition function  
• Runtime 
• Starting state selection 
 
Optionally, a diagram like the one below may accompany the STS. The set of states 
refers to all individual states the system can occupy (the “state space”). The set of starting 
states is a subset of the state space that identifies valid initial states for the system. The 
transition function describes the next state in terms of the current state, and is thus a 
function from the set of states to the set of states.  
 
The requirement that the transition function be a function is slightly stricter than simply 
equating it to a set of edges and the STS to a weakly connected graph.12 Requiring a 
function necessitates only one outgoing edge from each node (state). However, the 
requirement for a transition function does not exclude disconnected cycles,13 provided 
                                                
11 The interested reader might pursue Deterministic Finite State Machines for more. The 
differences between DFSM and STS have largely to do with the use of DFSM to 
determine acceptable words in a language, whereas, STS have been explicitly constructed 
to describe supertasks. 
12 A weakly connected graph is a directed graph (edges have arrows) in which, if one 
ignores the direction of the edges, there is a path from any node to any other node. 
13 A disconnected cycle refers to a cycle that, once entered, does not permit exit outside 
the cycle. Such cycles are possible due to the directed nature of the edges. 
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each cycle is accessible from a valid starting state (else, it is not a set of nodes the system 
can occupy, and thus is not a member of the system’s state space). 
 
While not strictly part of the STS, the runtime defines the length of the operation the STS 
will be used to evaluate in terms of number of transitions. For supertasks as described in 
this paper the runtime is ω0. Similarly, the selected starting state is not necessary for the 
definition of an STS, but may be necessary for the description of a particular run of an 
STS. 
 
For the Thomson Lamp the set of states is {off, on}. The set of starting states is likewise 
{off, on}.  The transition function is a simple negation: {off à on, on à off}. The 
runtime is ω0. The selected starting state is {off}.  
 
 
Figure 1. Thomson Lamp STS 
 
The proof of Theorem 1 above follows naturally from our definitions concerning STS’s 
and periods. Recalling the discussion of the parity of ω0 from the previous section, given 
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that the length of the period k is less than ω0, we know we can form ω0 many k-tuples.14 
Hence, after the completion of ω0 many transitions we have actually completed ω0 many 
traversals of the cycle described by the period and the final state is the same as the initial 
state. 
 
The theorem holds even in cases where there exist starting states from which no cycle is 
accessible, since it claims only that given a cycle (with finite period length) reachable by 
at least one initial state, the end result for this starting state is determined entirely by the 
starting state. Note that this holds even when the initial state is not a member of the cycle, 
by an extension of the argument that ω0 – 1 = ω0 for all finite replacements of 1. 
 
 Theorem 2: The solution in all cases described by Theorem 1 is always the  
 entry node of the accessed cycle. 
 
Where ‘entry node’ refers to the first node encountered that is part of the cycle, and 
‘accessed cycle’ refers to the cycle the run traverses. 
 
Figure 2. A simple STS with a cycle 
                                                
14 In other words, if k = 2, we can form ω0 many pairs in sequence. If k =3, ω0 many 
triples in sequence, etc. 
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For example, in Figure 2, the solution for start states 1, 2, and 3 is 3, while the solution 
for start state 4 is 4. 
 
A host of questions presents itself about the capacity of STS’s to accurately describe the 
behavior of various supertasks. Theorem 1 seems to generalize for all countably infinite 
supertasks, e.g. all ω-tasks where ω is some transfinite ordinal < ω1. Note that Theorem 2 
holds only if the order-type of the supertask is a limit ordinal.15 Precisely defining the 
ordinal relations between runtime, period length, and access-path length (e.g. length of 
path to access the cycle from a given starting state) remains to be done.16 Similarly, 
questions arise about the capacity of an STS to represent supertasks with transfinite state 
spaces (state sets with cardinality ≥ ℵ0).  
 
Can STS’s be extended to describe supertasks with non-deterministic transition functions, 
or supertasks whose runs include non-deterministic selection of starting states? How to 
describe a supertask with a multi-vergent transition function, e.g. one with multiple 
outgoing edges from a state, and where a given state is a composition of several state 
nodes (perhaps with a transition function on the power set?). Can the transition function 
rely on more history than just the previous state? 
                                                
15 E.g. it holds for ω0 and ω02, but not for ω0+2 nor ω0+1. The solution remains simple to 
compute with knowledge of the ‘remainder’ q after ω0: simply take q more transitions 
from the entry node of the accessed cycle. 
16 In our example access-path and period length require being on the lower side of a limit 
ordinal where the runtime is that limit ordinal. This relation may generalize to limit 
ordinal runtimes > ω0, thereby enabling access-path and period lengths that are still 
infinite, but proportionally smaller, limit ordinals. 
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Given responses to these questions it may be possible to define a hierarchy and typology 
of STS’s, providing a complexity classification for supertasks. It may even be the case 
that certain types of supertasks foreclose the knowability of their solutions, as may be the 
case with Thomson’s π-parity machines. In this example Thomson proposes one machine 
elaborating the digits of π, and another machine outputting 0 or 1 based on the oddness or 
evenness of the corresponding digit.  
 
π’s status as an irrational number guarantees the lack of any period with length < ω0, 
though this leaves open an intriguing question concerning STS’s with runtimes of ω2 or 
greater. Even more problematic, we lack a meaningful transition function based on the set 
of available states the decimal expansion of π can occupy, {0, 1…9}, as current methods 
for calculating π rely on iterative approaches or approaches based on the particular digit 
of π one wishes to calculate.17  
 
Further study on this question will no doubt make use of the rich resources available in 
the study of computational complexity and recursion theory such as Turing degrees and 
Turing jumps, Turing machines and oracles, and Markov processes. Indeed, some work 
in this direction has already begun.18 With a solution to Thomson’s Lamp in place, the 
                                                
17 Cf. Bailey, D.H., Borwein, P.B., and Plouffe, S. “A New Formula for Picking off 
Pieces of Pi,” Science News, v 148, p 279 (Oct 28, 1995). 
18 See Welch, P.D.. “Turing Unbound: on the extent of computation in Malament-
Hogarth spacetimes.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59.4 (Dec. 2008): 
659-674. 
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way is now clear for a logically defensible discussion of hypercomputation freed from the 
trappings of pure fancy. 
 
ORDER (POSITION) VS. SIZE (DISTANCE) 
We retreat now from the tantalizing opportunities presented in the model of the state 
transition system to consider more closely the philosophical ramifications of transfinite 
ordinals, as well as their bearing on both Thomson and Benacerraf’s original 
formulations. 
 
The transfinite ordinals do exactly what their name suggests: provide us a way to talk 
about position that traverses infinity. We consider the formal definition of limit ordinal 
given earlier. 
 
A limit ordinal is an ordinal number that is not a successor ordinal.  Specifically, 
an ordinal W is a limit ordinal if and only if there exists some ordinal x < W, and 
for any x < W there exists another ordinal y such that x < y < W. 
 
ω is a limit ordinal precisely because there is an ordinal smaller than it, and for all 
ordinals smaller than it there is an ordinal larger than that smaller one that is still smaller 
than ω. Herein lies the beauty of ω. There is no largest member of ℕ and yet ω exists. In 
fact, we define ω in precisely this fashion.  
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Benacerraf is right to point out that the confusion surrounding Thomson’s paradox may 
be due in no small part to the insufficiency of language colliding from two different 
domains, here the notion of a ‘task’ with the notion of the ‘infinite’ (Benacerraf, 782). If 
we rely on the intuitive notion of tasks as discrete operations, ω never arrives since by 
definition there is always one more task to complete.  
 
Nonetheless, by bracketing this infinite movement of ω within a definition, we may then 
talk about and even beyond ω, which is the beauty of the mathematical form. It is a 
logical and powerful consequence of the Axioms of Union and Infinity taken together. 
 
There is still something to be said vis-à-vis the suspicion with which one might view the 
definition of ω, given the lack of a largest member of ℕ. This anxiety marks something of 
significance for the philosophical consequence of Thomson’s Lamp, and transfinite 
ordinals more particularly. Namely, they inaugurate a concept of position or order 
decoupled from size or distance. Intuitively speaking, we conflate order with size 
regularly. The first place has the smallest distance from zero. The second the second 
smallest, and so on.  
 
What must be stressed is the intimate relation between distance from zero and size. 
Recall our nested definition of numbers. Recall as well that the cardinality of such a set is 
equivalent to the number that set is. Distance from zero is enumerated via the successor 
function, which successively adds one element to the set. This enlargement by one 
corresponds to a positional increase by one as well, moving us from an ordinal to its 
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successor ordinal. The correspondence between increase in size and increase in position 
has been necessary, logical, and irreversible.  
 
Only in the limit ordinal does the relationship between the cardinality of the set in 
question and its place as an ordinal become unmoored. By definition the number of 
ordinals less than ω is infinite. Specifically, it is countably infinite. To say a set is 
countably infinite is to say that it can exist in bijection (one to one correspondence) with ℕ. Following Cantor, whose work birthed the study of the transfinites, we say all these 
sets have cardinality ℵ0. Even the sets ω+1, or ω2 (the second limit ordinal) have 
cardinality ℵ0 (the first transfinite with cardinality greater than ℵ0 is ω1). 
 
Strictly speaking, then, we cannot say that the number of numbers in the set ω is greater 
or less than the number of numbers in the set ω+1. Yet, we can say that ω+1 occupies a 
different position from ω. This is the first time in our discussion of numbers’ positions 
that two numbers with equal cardinality have been identified as occupying different 
positions. It is likewise the first time that size and order are no longer co-extensive, hence 
our earlier criticism of Thomson’s slippage between ℵ0 and ω in our discussion of 
chocolate. 
 
THE METRICAL AND THE ORDINAL 
What are we to make of this apparently paradoxical decoupling of position and size? In 
reality, the alliance between size and position belies a much more profound alignment, 
active but unnoticed, in the analyses of Thomson and Benacerraf. Both pass over a 
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remarkable relation between two very different kinds of limits employed: the metrical, 
and the ordinal. Thomson in his rejection of infinite sums as proof of paradox in 
supertasks, and Benacerraf in his equivocation between the approach to an upper-bound 
on the reals and the completion of the supertask. 
 
These two limits will become clearer as we consider summations of infinite series, which 
Thomson takes to be self-contradictory (8-9). First, some definitions. A metric, or 
distance function, provides a distance between elements of a set. A metric space is a set 
with a metric. The Euclidean space of dimension one is the real number line.  
 
Consider the definition of the metrical limit. 
  
 lim is the limit of a sequence xn if, for all ε ∈ ℝ where ε > 0,  
there exists some n ∈ ℕ such that for all m ∈ ℕ where m > n,  
|xm - lim| < ε.19 
 
What must be emphasized here is the crucial difference between the limit at work in the 
sum of an infinite series and the limit at work in the first limit ordinal, ω. We see two 
infinites, moving in opposite directions. First the infinity of the increase in the input term, 
the n in xn. For this infinity only a cardinality of ℵ0 is necessary, so the set ℕ suffices.  
 
                                                
19 An equivalent definition is offered on p. 38 of Courant, Richard, and E.J. McShane. 
Differential and Integral Calculus. 2nd ed. Vol. 1. London and Glasgow: Blackie & Son 
Limited, 1937. We offer the above formation for clarity of argument. 
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We have as second infinity the closeness measure ε, which may be made arbitrarily small 
provided it remains greater than zero. What our definition says is that no matter how 
small we make ε, there exists some natural number beyond which the distance between 
outputs of the function and our limit is less than ε. Thus, no matter how close to the limit 
we wish to force our output, we are capable of doing so.  
 
This second infinity requires an infinity of cardinality 2ℵ0, that of the set of reals ℝ. In 
each of Thomson’s supertask examples (chocolate, [0, 1), the lamp) there has been a tacit 
acknowledgement of domain ℕ for the function representing the supertask. This domain 
has functioned indexically, providing the current position in the execution of the 
supertask. The co-domain for the output of this function has been different in each case: ℕ (total lumps of chocolate), ℝ (position on the interval [0, 1)), or {0, 1} (lamp off or on) 
respectively.  
 
However, in the latter two supertasks there has also been a second function, that of the 
timekeeper. This function maps the index of the supertask’s operation to the reals via the 
geometric sequence xn = 1/2n-1. This sequence provides the successively decreasing 
intervals of time in our two minute march to infinity.20  
 
Any supertask requires a bounded period of time for its execution. Thus, there will 
always be some infinite series on the reals to provide a decreasing time per execution. It 
                                                
20 In the [0, 1) example this function also gives the runner’s position, so the supertask 
function and timekeeper function are mathematically identical. It should also be noted 
that strictly speaking, the chocolate division was not a supertask as its operation was not 
finitely bounded by time. 
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is because the set ℝ of our metric space, to which our distance function applies, is infinite 
with cardinality 2ℵ0 that we can produce arbitrarily small distances with our closeness 
measure ε. These distances in turn permit an infinite timekeeper series to accelerate our 
supertask to completion. A cardinality ≤ ℵ0 would not provide for arbitrarily infinitesimal 
intervals to be cut. 
 
Hence the limit in the timekeeper sense is a measure that only makes sense with distance 
(the metric); whereas, the limit of ω (which gives position in the supertask sequence) 
forces us to decouple position (order) from size (distance). So when Thomson asks us to 
consider the sum of an infinite series as a limit,21 and uses that to speak of a set of ω 
tasks, he appears to be equivocating between two different infinities.  
 
In point of fact this equivocation is likely the cause for Benacerraf’s critique, which 
spends most of its time concerned with the approach to an open upper bound on a 
segment of the reals (e.g. the vanishing genie).22 Can we find a way to resolve the tension 
between metrical and ordinal limits for supertasks?  
 
                                                
21 See p. 7-9 of “Tasks and Super-Tasks” where Thomson discusses Watling’s arguments 
about summing convergent infinite series. In particular p. 9 where Thomson concludes 
that insufficiencies in likening a convergent limit to an actually terminating sequence of 
sums has some bearing on the logical possibility of supertasks. 
22 The genie’s size halves with every advance in the series xn = 1/2n-1 (thus vanishing at 
the two minute mark) and beautifully illustrates Benacerraf’s argument that conditions 
prior to t1 cannot be used to evaluate the system at t1 or later. As Thomson notes, 
Benacerraf fails to provide definitive means for evaluating the state of the system at t1 or 
later. 
PRE-PUBLICATION DRAFT 
02/18/2015 
32 
We maintain that the ordinal and metrical limits are directly related. It is precisely the 
inexhaustibility of ℕ (necessary for ω) that allows us to state definitively that there is 
some sufficiently large n ∈ ℕ beyond which our function’s output satisfies all possible 
closeness measures to the metrical limit. In distinction to the “illusion…that one might 
reach the sum…by actually adding together all the terms of the infinite sequence,” what 
the definition of a function’s limit for metric spaces shows us is that the ‘sum’ here is 
understood in the only way possible: in relation to a function’s output as its input 
increases without bound (9). What is up for discussion is the behavior of a function under 
variation, not a finite sum and its numerical terms, a point to which we return in our 
discussion of Deleuze. 
 
While this explanation compels a reconsideration of Thomson’s equivocation between 
different infinities, have we really answered the most basic objection to the summation of 
an infinite series: that it could never take place? Should we fail here, must we not also 
refuse to admit the possibility of any supertask whatsoever (as Thomson concludes)?  
 
Consider what happens if we set the closeness measure to zero. The only argument 
capable of satisfying that closeness measure is to evaluate the function at xω, the first 
position after the set of natural numbers. We see that the only number capable of 
reducing distance between series and sum (metrical limit) to zero is precisely the first 
number that decouples distance from position (limit ordinal). Paradoxically (but only to 
the non-mathematician), the number that could guarantee distance travelled, as in the 
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Thomson experiment of walking the midpoints from [0, 1), is the number that requires us 
to let go of distance (size).23  
 
IDENTIFYING FREGE 
What shall we make of the equality established with the reduction of our closeness 
measure, ε, to 0?  
 
Eqn 2   xω = limnà∞xn 
 
On the one hand, we appear to have reached ω by walking patiently along ℕ. On the 
other, we seem to have approached ω by shrinking to zero our closeness measure ε along 
the reals. Mathematically the confusion is absent. We did not approach ω by shrinking ε, 
but instead approached xω, the ωth term in the series xn. It is the difference (a real 
quantity) of this value with the limit of xn that has shrunk to zero. 
 
Nonetheless the equality above contains a measure of interest for us, insofar as it 
collapses or otherwise brings into momentary contact the metrical and ordinal limits. 
How shall we theorize this contact? And how shall we theorize this equation? Let us start 
with the problem of the equality itself, and with that duly considered proceed to examine 
the point of contact. 
 
                                                
23 For more see “compactification.” There are interesting methods of compactification, 
e.g. bending the real number line into a circle with one point joining +/- ∞, ripe for 
analysis. 
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Of immediate interest to us is the equals sign. It is this sign that binds the equation 
together, providing its motive force and bringing about contact between the two limits. 
To consider its implications we look to Frege’s Begriffsschrift. Inspired by Leibniz’s call 
for “a universal characteristic…a calculus philosophicus or ratiocinator,” Frege aims to 
construct a “pure logic…disregarding the particular characteristics of objects, [that] 
depends solely on those laws upon which all knowledge rests” (B, 6, 5). 24  
 
Frege begins by defining his symbols. Of particular interest to us is §8 “Identity of 
content,” where the sign ‘=’ is discussed (B, 20). It appears as though this section simply 
asserts a transparent meaning for the ‘=’ sign, which Frege labels the “identity of 
content” sign (B, 20). Namely, that the figures on the left and right share the same 
content.  However, the field opened by the identity sign is more complex than it seems. 
 
Professor Bar-Elli’s excellent reading of §8 opens the way for our analysis. There exists a 
tripled field between name, sign and content that the identity sign arbitrates. Frege is 
direct, opening the section with an unambiguous sentence where he shifts from speaking 
of signs to names. “Identity of content differs from conditionality and negation [two 
symbols previously introduced] in that it applies to names and not to contents” (B, 20). 
 
Bar-Elli describes the magnitude of this terminological shift, writing that “[t]hroughout 
this section, except for the last sentence, Frege speaks of identity consistently in terms of 
names, i.e. signs endowed with modes of determining their contents, whereas in the rest 
                                                
24 Throughout, citations marked ‘B’ refer to Begriffsschrift. 
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of the book he talks, where identities are concerned, simply of signs” (Bar-Elli, 357). A 
sign “just denotes its content; this exhausts its meaning. A name, in contrast, includes a 
mode of determination (Bestimmungsweise) of its content” (Bar-Elli, 357). 
 
In typical usage we have a sign stand in for its content. “The correlation between a sign 
and its content is an arbitrary convention or stipulation” whereby a sign expressly links 
its content to the text and is exhausted in this operation (Bar-Elli, 358). “The semantics of 
names, in contrast, is ‘thick’: a name does not only denote its content, but includes and 
expresses a way its content is determined. This, Frege emphasizes, is an objective feature 
that pertains to the ‘essence of things’ (Wesen der Sache), to use his terms” (Bar-Elli, 
358).  
 
A name must carry its own history with it. This history is in fact an objective and 
essential feature of the name and its content. It forms a rich, ‘thick’ linkage between 
name and content that is “not arbitrary or conventional” (Bar-Elli, 358). Frege himself is 
quite explicit on this matter. “At first we have the impression that what we are dealing 
with pertains merely to the expression and not to the thought, that we do not need 
different signs at all for the same content and hence no sign whatsoever for identity of 
content. To show that this is an empty illusion I take the following example from 
geometry…” (B, 21). 
 
Frege goes on to demonstrate how two different points A and B on a circle are actually 
the same, once it is understood that the differing specifications given for each point yield 
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the same position on the circle’s circumference. However, absent the proof that the two 
points are in fact identical, no such statement could be made. Thus it is not a simple 
matter of a redundant sign for identical contents, but instead a matter of necessity that an 
identity of content sign demarcates a relation of equivalence between two contestable 
micro-genealogies, the thick descriptions of the name-content relations embedded in each 
of the names on either side of the ‘=’ sign. 
 
In a remarkable passage Frege writes,  
 
“Whereas in other contexts signs are merely representatives of their content, so 
that every combination into which they enter expresses only a relation between 
their respective contents, they suddenly display their own selves when they are 
combined by means of the sign for identity of content; for it expresses the 
circumstance that two names have the same content. Hence the introduction of a 
sign for identity of content necessarily produces a bifurcation in the meaning of 
all signs: they stand at times for their content, at times for themselves” (B, 20-21). 
 
The distinction between sign and name is no doubt the chief innovation of §8, as Bar-Elli 
notes. Far from a universal logic whose application depends not at all on the particulars 
of the objects before it, this logical sign reveals the others as very much alive, 
contestable, and inseparable from their histories. The sign responsible for arbitrating 
identity of content produces an inherent bifurcation in all signs. Signs come to “stand at 
times for their content, at times for themselves” (B, 21).  
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Returning to Equation 2, we now note that the identity sign effects a doubling in each of 
the terms surrounding it. Reading the equation requires entering each sign, converging on 
the self-same content the two share, and then rebounding along different paths to return 
to their names, tracing an echo along each micro-history. The import of the equation is 
not simply that the two signs express the same content, nor less still that the two names 
are different ways of expressing the same content. Rather, the significance is that the two 
ways of determining expressed by each name, while distinct, have converged upon the 
same concept. It is precisely in the operation of the identity symbol itself that we find this 
yoking of difference, an expression that in this paper cements the resolution of a paradox. 
 
FOLDING DELEUZE 
Within the dual compression and expansion of the content and its two names’ histories 
we find the point of contact between the metrical and ordinal limits. We turn now to 
investigate the nature of this contact. 
 
Recall that in the chocolate task Thomson argues ω (though he misidentifies it as ℵ0) is 
never reached. Though the chocolate-cutter continues dividing without rest, we never 
reach an ‘infinity’ of chocolate pieces. We simply experience an infinity of numbers of 
pieces into which the chocolate can be divided.  
 
This argument is analogous to saying that ω+1 never arrives. Since we present ω+1 as the 
first instant in time following the completion of the supertask, it necessarily falls outside 
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of the function defined over the duration of the supertask, e.g., there is no xω+1. Thus it is 
the presence of a bounded interval on the reals (i.e., the two minutes of button presses) 
that elicits ω and brings forth the completion of the supertask. 
 
Speaking precisely, it is the infinition25 in the approach to the upper bound on the reals 
driven by decreasing towards zero the closeness factor ε (metrical limit) that joins with 
the infinition in procession of natural numbers towards the ωth transition of the system 
representing the state of the task (ordinal limit). There is a special structure at work here, 
which following Deleuze we identify as the fold. The fold occurs between the doubled 
use of the ordinal limit to drive not only the evaluation of the metrical limit (the closure 
of the finite time series on the reals occurs at argument number ω), but also the state of 
the supertask system itself (i.e. the resting position within the STS defined above is the 
result of transition ω). 
 
It is no mistake that we find the shape of our contact, first illuminated by Bar-Elli’s 
reading of Frege’s identity sign for content, in Deleuze’s The Fold (subtitled 
appropriately “Leibniz and the Baroque”). The fold is precisely the shape of the structure 
that links the dual separation of each sign from its content and itself on the one hand to 
the convergent commonality of their distinct micro-histories on the other.  
 
                                                
25 Borrowed from Levinas, this term refers to the process of producing infinities. We may 
transliterate it mathematically to emphasize the motive quality of infinite successor 
operations, each producing the argument for the next. See p. 25-26 of Levinas, 
Emmanuel. Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority. The Hague: M. Nijhoff ;, 1979. 
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As we saw previously, this contact is brought about by the consideration of these two 
limits, metrical and ordinal. We mentioned that the ordinal is doubled, but in point of fact 
so is the metrical. For it is so not only in the decrease towards zero of ε, but also in the 
increase towards the upper-bound of the real time interval. These two sites correspond, in 
what is already another fold, to the ordinal’s role in the evaluation of the closure of the 
time interval and the ordinal’s role in presenting to completion the state of the supertask 
system, respectively.26 
 
What has been instrumental from the outset (and something both Thomson and 
Benacerraf were acutely aware of) is the consideration of infinite sums, and thus limits. 
“The definition of Baroque mathematics is born with Leibniz. The object of the discipline 
is a ‘new affection’ of variable sizes, which is variation itself” (F, 17).27 The key of the 
new differential calculus is that variability itself is made to vary. 
 
 “To be sure, in a fractional number or even in an algebraic formula, variability is  
 not considered as such, since each of the terms has or must have a particular  
 value.  The same no longer holds either for the irrational number and  
 corresponding serial calculus, or for the differential quotient and differential  
 calculus, in which variation becomes presently infinite” (F, 17).  
 
                                                
26 The associations crisscross precisely because the value of the metrical limit is the 
closure of the time interval on the reals (e.g. the 2 minute mark in the lamp case).  
27 Throughout, ‘F’ in citation refers to The Fold. 
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Though he was unaware of it, Thomson’s rejoinder to Benacerraf in Zeno’s Paradoxes 
already contained the key to solving his original supertask: “[i]n general, the idea of an 
ω-task arises from consideration of a bounded ω-sequence of points on the real line” (ZP, 
134). Deleuze solves the puzzle for us. It is in the transition from discontinuous variation 
to continuously variable variation, in other words the advent of calculus of the 
infinitesimals, that “exposes” the “straight line of rational points…as a false infinity, a 
simple undefinite that includes an infinity of lacunae” (F, 17).28 
 
“In short, there will always be an inflection that makes a fold from variation, and that 
brings the fold or the variation to infinity” (F, 18). Without the bounded segment on the 
reals there was insufficient infinition to bring about the appearance of ω, thinkable (as we 
know from our set theoretic study of the ordinals) only with an imaginary “xω+1.” What 
the solution to Thomson’s Lamp above, together with the concomitant discovery and 
resolution of an apparent paradox between metrical and ordinal limits demonstrate, is 
precisely the stakes of the conceptual move at work in imagining xω+1.  
 
CONCLUSION 
While Frege’s identity of content sign explains how contact between the metrical and 
ordinal occurs in Equation 2, Deleuze’s fold explains what that contact is. It is tempting 
to conclude a general philosophical schema for supertasks exists. Namely, that a 
                                                
28 “Between the two [rational] points A and B…there always remains the possibility for 
carrying out the right isosceles triangle, whose hypotenuse goes from A to B, and whose 
summit, C, determines a circle that crosses the straight line between A and B. The arc of 
the circle resembles a branch of inflection…that from an irrational number, at the 
meeting of the curved and straight lines, produces a point-fold” (F, 18). 
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supertasks folds together two limits that operate on sets whose cardinalities are separated 
by one degree.29 
 
The philosophical understanding of supertasks presented here may accelerate discovery 
of higher-cardinality supertask conditions, while the computational model of the STS 
provides future researchers a robust scaffolding to compose a hierarchical typology of 
supertask complexity. 
 
While tantalizing, these directions remains for future research, particularly in 
collaboration with other specialists.30 Indeed, the current article would not be possible 
without the research and cooperation of a multidisciplinary field of academics.31 It is our 
hope that this article also provides a compelling case for the contributions philosophy, 
both analytic and continental, can make to multidisciplinary research, particularly in the 
burgeoning field of hypercomputation. 
 
  
                                                
29 In technical language, assuming the continuum hypothesis, sets whose aleph numbers 
are one apart. If one does not wish to assume the continuum hypothesis, this relationship 
can be recast as follows: sets for whom one set’s cardinality is equivalent to the 
cardinality of the power set of the other. An interesting question presents itself: if a given 
supertask has some aleph number x and we attempt to fold it into another set with aleph 
number x+2, can we say that the supertask actually completes x+1 many times? 
30 In addition to the earlier referenced “Turing Unbound,” cf. Etesi, Gabor and Nemeti, 
Istvan. “Non-Turing computations via Malament-Hogarth space-times.” International 
Journal of Theoretical Physics 41 (2002) 341-370.  
31 Additional heartfelt thanks for clear and consistent conversation to [REDACTED] 
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